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NOTE

Exploring the Last Frontiers for Mineral
Resources: A Comparison of
International Law Regarding the Deep
Seabed, Outer Space, and Antarctica
ABSTRACT

The nations of the world have begun to tap three resource areas-the
deep seabed, outer space, and Antarctica. These areas are unique insofar as no nation can claim them exclusively as its own. As a result, these
three areas raise unique international questions. Not only are they
largely undisturbed, but these areas are also the testing groundfor recently developed internationaltreaties that attempt to usher in a new era
of international cooperation. This Note examines both the exploration
and exploitation of mineral resources in the deep seabed, outer space,
and Antarctica. The physical nature of each area, the resources available to humankind, the technological and economic feasibility of future
explorations, and the environmental concerns surrounding mineral resource development will be examined. Within each section, the author
discusses the treaty systems governing each environment,focusing particularly on the most recent attempts toformulate policy. The historical development, structure, and current status of these latest attempts are examined. By comparing the development, successes, and failures of the
treaty systems, this Note attempts to highlight past experiences to suggest
a system that will better serve the world community in the next century.
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INTRODUCTION

Certain regions of the earth's surface, including the deep seabed and
Antarctica, as well as the moon and outer space,1 are considered res communis, or the territory of no nation.2 Traditionally, sovereignty has determined which nations have possessory control over territory. Because
the sovereignty issue remains unresolved for the areas discussed in this
Note, mineral exploration and development may be possible only
through multinational organizations.
Coastal nations have claimed jurisdiction over the sea at distances up
to two hundred miles from shore.' Beyond this limit, no nation has a

1. In its discussion of the moon and outer space, this Note recognizes the possibility
that minerals may be discovered and mined on other celestial bodies such as asteroids.
2. See Schwetje, ProtectingSpace Assets: A Legal Analysis of "Keep Out Zones", 15
J. SPACE L. 131, 141 (1987).
3. N.E. LEECH, C.T. OLIVER, & J.M. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 213 (3d ed. 1988). Each coastal nation enjoys a territorial sea up to 12 nautical
miles from the shoreline, a contiguous zone extending past the territorial sea up to 24
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claim of sovereignty over the deep sea and the seabed. Rather, the members of the United Nations have declared this portion of the seabed, and
the resources within it, to be the "common heritage of mankind.""
Outer space, too, is considered beyond national jurisdiction. The moon
is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty.5 Article 2 of the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies8 (the Moon Treaty), which is considered customary international law, binds all nations to this7 principle regardless of whether they are parties to the Moon Treaty.
Unlike the deep sea and outer space, however, nations claim sovereignty over a majority of Antarctica's land mass even though it is unclear
whether the world community has recognized these claims.8 In fact, the
claims of many nations overlap. 9 The Antarctic Treaty ° is neither a
renunciation nor an affirmation of previously asserted rights of territorial
sovereignty, and while the treaty is in force, there can be no basis for an
assertion of sovereignty." Thus, the Antarctic Treaty attempts to pre-

miles from the shoreline, and an exclusive economic zone extending up to 200 miles from
shore. See Note, Antarctic Resource Jurisdictionand the Law of the Sea: A Question of
Compromise, 11 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 45, 60-61 (1985); see also Proclamation No.
5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983) (President Reagan proclaimed that United States sovereignty over the seabed extended seaward from the coastline for 200 nautical miles.).
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec. 10,
1982, art. 136, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 [hereinafter Third LOS Convention], reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982). The "common heritage" principle requires that all
nations share the benefits of exploited resources. See infra Part II.B.3.
5. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
6. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 46) at 77, U.N. Doc. A34/46 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty]. Article 2 states:
All activities on the moon, including its exploration and use, shall be carried out in
accordance. with international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, and taking into account the Declaration on Principles of International Law
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly on 24 October 1970 in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding, and with due regard
to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties.
Id. art. 2. See infra Part III.B.2.
7. See Schwetje, supra note 2, at 141.
8. See infra notes 152 & 156 and accompanying text.
9. See Note, supra note 3, at 56-57.
10. Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 (entered into force June 23, 1961). See infra Part IV.B.
11. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
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serve the status quo on the continent.12 Although nations have claimed
Antarctic territory, the lack of an international consensus on how to preserve or develop the area makes the Antarctic an appropriate comparison
to the deep seabed and outer space.
II.

THE DEEP SEABED

A.

Natural Resources

Over a century ago, people began to consider the sea as a source of
minerals, and seabed mining was proposed as early as 1876.13 Not until
the 1970s, however, with the necessary technological innovations and financial opportunities, did research begin on the feasibility of extracting
deep seabed resources as an alternative to land-based minerals. 4
Studies reveal that a wealth of resources exist in the deep seabed with
the most common minerals being cobalt, copper, manganese, and
nickel.' These hard minerals'" are recoverable from both mineral nodules and mineral crusts. Nodules are potato-shaped concretions that lie
loosely over much of the deeper portions of the ocean floor.' Researchers, however, have discovered only a few areas' 8 containing nodules rich

12.
13.
14.

Id. art. 9.
See Simpson, Battle for the Moon, Sci. DIG., June 1982, at 12, 13.
Note, Alternative Regimes for the Exploitation of Manganese Nodules and
Their Impacts, 10 J. POL'Y MODELING 317, 317 (1988).
15. Roberts, Uncertain Prospectsfor Deep Ocean Mining, BIoSCIENCE, Jan. 1983,
at 14, 15.
16. Hard minerals do not include oil. Oil has yet to become a major concern within
the deep seabed debate because the bulk of offshore oil production will continue within
200 nautical miles of the coast and at depths of much less than 1000 meters. See A.M.
POST, DEEPSEA MINING AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 9 (1983). It is estimated that

between 80% and 95% of world oil reserves are located within the 200 nautical mile
exclusive economic zone. Id.
17. Nodules lie at depths of 5000 meters or more and usually beyond the 200 mile
exclusive economic zone. See S. MAHMOUDI, THE LAW OF DEEP SEA-BED MINING 28
(1987) (citing Clark & Clark, Marine Metallic Mineral Resources of the Pacific Basin,
3 MARINE RESOURCE ECON. 45, 50 (1986)). Therefore, areas with great amounts of
minerals in nodules usually are not subject to national appropriation. See supra notes 34 and accompanying text.
18. The Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone, located in the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and Central America, contains an estimated 3.5 million to 13.5 million metric tons
of nodules, which might support 25 to 30 mining operations. See Roberts, supra note
15, at 16. Nodules with significant amounts of minerals also are present in thp northeastern equatorial Pacific Ocean, the southern and western Pacific Ocean, and the central
Indian Ocean. See Cronan, A Fortune on the Sea Bed, UNESCO COURIER, Feb. 1986, at
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enough in minerals to make their recovery economically viable."9 The
estimated mass of nodules on the entire ocean floor ranges from over four
billion tons to trillions 'of tons.2"
Crusts are the other source of hard minerals found in the deep sea.
The crusts, rich in cobalt2 and manganese,22 occur as coatings up to
several centimeters thick on rock outcrops.2 3 Crusts are prevalent at
much shallower depths than nodules,24 resulting in two effects. First, it
is more likely that crusts will be located within the jurisdictional limits
of nations. Second, it will be easier for the nations that exercise jurisdiction to recover the minerals in crusts. More problems exist in the recovery of nodules because they are available only in deeper waters and usually occur outside a nation's territorial waters.
1. Technological and Economic Capability
Various methods for mining the deep seabed have been proposed,
ranging from a system of buckets that scrape the ocean floor to remotecontrolled submarine shuttles or hydraulic lift systems that collect the
nodules.25 Although technologically feasible, these proposals are economically problematic. The value of the metals present in nodules or crusts,
the concentration of nodules or the thickness of the crusts at the mine
site, the efficiency of recovery, and the costs of deep seabed mining must
be compared to the costs of competitive land-based mining.2" Experts

19. See id. The economically exploitable nodules have the following concentrations of
minerals: 23% manganese, 1.3% nickel, 1% copper, and 0.22% cobalt. See S.
MAHMOUDI, supra note 17, at 28.
20. See A.M. POST, supra note 16, at 11. See generally W. HAUSER, THE LEGAL
REGIME FOR DEEP SEABED MINING UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 11-

14 (1983).
21. Crusts consist of up to 2% of this strategic metal, which has a limited land supply. See Cronan, supra note 18, at 8.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Although nodules are richest when located at depths greater than 4500 meters,
the highest grade crusts are present at depths less than 2000 meters. Id.
25. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 16. See generally Broad, Proliferationof Sophisticated Robots Opens a New Age of Ocean Exploration, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1990, at
B5, col. 3 (discussing technological advances in deep sea robots).
26. See A.M. POST, supra note 16, at 14; see also Deep Seabed Mining: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 54 (1977) [hereinafter Seabed Hearings] (Experts
estimate that ocean mining companies must be prepared to spend more than $2.5 million
between initial start-up and commercial recovery on the first few mines located in the
Clarion-Clipperton fracture zone.). A 1981 estimate predicted that between $1 billion
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predict that deep seabed mining will not compete with land-based mining in the near future. " To compete, deep seabed mining technology
must become more cost-effective or the price of minerals must rise. Competitive deep seabed mining will be more difficult if international agreements compel those who spend the time and effort recovering the minerals to surrender some of their profits.
2.

Environmental Concerns

Mining of the deep seabed not only will disrupt the ocean floor environment, but the sediment discharge from mining ships also will affect
the surface water and the remainder of the ocean's ecosystem.2 The effects of these disturbances will be severe if they are not addressed
29
adequately.
B.

Treaties

As the nations of the world realized that deep seabed mining would
cause various problems in the future, they attempted to create systems
regulating its development. Although their early attempts successfully established a basic regulatory framework, subsequent negotiations concerning the specific problems of mineral resources have been less successful.
1. Early Attempts
In 1958, the United Nations created three documents that initiated the
modern development of the Law of the Sea. The documents, which comprise the First Law of the Sea Convention (the First LOS Convention),

and $1.5 billion would be needed for a typical mining operation. See Kindt, Ocean Resources and Marine Pollution: Putting the Development of Ocean Resources in Proper
Perspective, 6 Hous. J. INT'L L. 111, 135 (1984).
In determining the economic feasibility of such a project, one also must consider that
financial institutions may not be willing to loan substantial amounts of money if a significant likelihood exists that a treaty on the Law of the Sea will affect adversely any
possible operations. See Seabed Hearings, supra, at 54; see also infra Part II.B.
27. "[M]ining might begin in 1995, 2000, or later." Roberts, supra note 15, at 17;
see Current Development, Statement by Expert Panel: Deep Seabed Mining and the
1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 363, 363 (1988).
28. See Roberts, supra note 15, at 17. Dislocated sediment can take up to five years
to settle through 100 yards of water. See Kindt, supra note 26, at 137.
29. Environmental concerns have been less of an issue within the deep seabed debate
than in the Antarctic context. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. The reason
may be that Antarctica is less spoiled and the effects of pollution are more visible on
Antarctica than under the ocean's surface.
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30
were the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
the Convention on the High Seas,"1 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf.3 2 Although the First LOS Convention served as a basis for
an international law of the sea, it enumerated no guidelines for mining
the deep seabed because, at the time these documents were drafted, deep
sea mineral resource exploration had not yet developed.

2.

The Third Law of the Sea Convention

The international debate regarding mineral resources began with negotiations that culminated in the Third United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (the Third LOS Convention), which opened for signature in 1982.3' The Third LOS Convention created certain entities to
facilitate orderly exploration of the deep seabed's natural resources.
34
First, it established the International Seabed Authority (the Authority)
to license and regulate mineral exploration on that portion of the ocean
floor located beyond the limits of national jurisdiction3 5 known as the
"Area."'3 6 The Authority's decisions are made on a one-nation, one-vote
basis. 3'7 Most major decisions, therefore, are controlled by the developing
countries 8 because they outnumber the industrialized nations within the
30. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into
force Sept. 10, 1964).
31. Geneva Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
32. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
33. Third LOS Convention, supra note 4. The Third LOS Convention was the result of nearly six years of preparatory work. See Kimball, Turning Points in the Future
of Deep Seabed Mining, 17 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 367, 371 (1986).
34. "All States Parties are ipso facto members of the Authority." Third LOS Convention, supra note 4, art. 156, para. 2.
35. See Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource
Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 727, 740 (1986).
36. See generally Third LOS Convention, supra note 4, arts. 133-55.
37. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 740.
38. The developing countries commonly are referred to as the "Group of 77." The
Group of 77 was established in 1963 by 77 nonaligned nations. The membership of the
Group of 77 now exceeds 100 countries. See Note, supra note 3, at 61; see also Raclin,
supra note 35, at 752-53 n.174. Through its voting power, the Group of 77 has dominated the United Nations General Assembly since the mid-1960s. See Kindt, Ice-Covered
Areas and the Law of the Sea: Issues Involving Resource Exploitation and the
Antarctic Environment, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 27, 41 n.94 (1988). This alignment
has shifted the power structure not only within the United Nations, but also in international negotiations in general.
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United Nations."9

The Third LOS Convention also created its own intergovernmental
mining company (the Enterprise) to compete with those private companies licensed by the Authority to exploit the resources in the Area.40 In
addition, the Third LOS Convention created a detailed system for the
regulation of mining of the deep seabed. 4 '
There has not been a consensus on this system because the developing
countries, which have the controlling numbers in United Nations negotiations, cQuld not reach an agreement with the industrialized nations,
which possess the technology. The Third LOS Convention, which embodies the goals of the developing countries, has split the nations of the
world on the issue of deep seabed mining and set the stage for treaty
negotiations in other areas. The developing nations view the deep seabed
as one of the last remaining common areas owned jointly by all the people of the world.42 This view is referred to as the "common heritage"
principle.
3.

The Common Heritage Principle

The common heritage principle,4 3 which governs the Third LOS Convention, recognizes that the world's natural resources are being depleted.4 4 At first, the principle was viewed as a philosophical or moral
concept, but it now has gained acceptance in legal communities through-

39. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 741.
40. Third LOS Convention, supra note 4, art. 170. The Third LOS Convention
established a parallel system, designed both to provide a profit incentive to industrialized
nations and to guarantee an equitable share of the resources to developing countries. See
Note, supra note 3, at 61.
41. Third LOS Convention, supra note 4, arts. 192-237.
42. To be compensated for years of unequal treatment, the developing nations believe
that justice requires that they receive a greater share of the deep seabed resources. See
Recent Development, InternationalAgreements-Agreement on the Resolution of Practical Problems with Respect to Deep Seabed Mining Areas, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 216,
224 (1989). See generally Shyam, Deep Seabed Mining: An Indian Perspective, 17
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 325 (1986).
43. "The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind." Third LOS
Convention, supra note 4, art. 136.
44. The source of this phrase is disputed. Compare Matte, The Common Heritageof
Mankind and Outer Space: Toward a New InternationalOrderfor Survival, 12 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 313, 316-17 (1987) (citing Oscar Shachter, Assistant Director,
U.N. Legal Department, who in 1952, five years before Sputnik, suggested that outer
space should "be the common property of all mankind") and Raclin, supra note 35, at
737 (crediting United Nations Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta with raising this point
in 1967 when commenting on deep sea resources).

COMPARISON OF INTERNATIONAL MINERAL REGIMES

19901

out the world.45 Nevertheless, this concept is a source of concern for industrialized nations such as the United States.46
Although there is no accepted single definition of the common heritage
principle,4 most definitions contain five common elements: (1) the area
under consideration cannot be subject to appropriation; (2) all countries
must share in management of the resources; (3) there must be an active
sharing of the benefits derived from the exploitation of the resources; (4)
the area must be dedicated exclusively to peaceful purposes, and (5) the
area must be preserved for future generations. 8
Developing countries maintain that the principle requires an absence
of private ownership rights in any area that is deemed to be the common
heritage of mankind. 49 These developing countries also argue that the
designated area should be managed by a multinational board5" and that
the benefits of the activities within the area should be shared with all
nations, regardless of which nations participate in the exploitation of the
resources.

51

Industrialized nations, on the other hand, object to the inclusion of the
common heritage principle in treaties,5 2 maintaining that the principle
discourages the development of resources. 53 These nations contend that
deep seabed minerals, and the profits derived from their exploitation,
should be retained by those technologically able to retrieve them.54 Thus,

45. See Matte, supra note 44, at 383-84.
46. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text (discussing the common heritage
principle in the context of the moon); see also infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text
(discussing the common heritage principle in the context of Antarctica).
47. Possible definitions of the common heritage principle range from requiring profit
sharing, to international control of resources for redistributing wealth and technology
among nations, to the opinion that the term merely denotes access to land for mineral
exploitation. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 738-39; see also Matte, supra note 44, at 319;
Note, ExtraterrestrialLaw on the Final Frontier: A Regime to Govern the Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEo. L.J. 1427, 1436-37 (1983).
48. See Matte, supra note 44, at 320-21 (quoting Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, Legal Sub-Comm., Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.75
(1967)); see also Note, Allocation of Mineral Resources in Antarctica: Problems and a
Possible Solution, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 525, 536 (1987).
49. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 739.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 738-39.
53. See id. at 739.
54. Larson, Deep Seabed Mining: A Definition of the Problem, 17 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 271, 275 (1986); see also Recent Development, supra note 42, at 219 (On July
9, 1988, President Reagan indicated that the "United States would not sign the [Third
LOS] Convention because of its 'inimical' provisions on mining the seabed beyond na-
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the United States disagrees with both the common heritage principle5 5
and the Third LOS Convention's requirement that the Authority should
"acquire technology"" 6 and "promote and encourage the transfer to de' 57
veloping States of such technology."
The Third LOS Convention's provision "for the equitable sharing of
financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the
Area""8 also has generated debate. Industrialized countries find this provision unacceptable because of its implied effects. In their view, this provision could be the basis for production guidelines and limitations 9 as
well as the assumption of decision-making authority by those countries
that are technologically and economically incapable of mining. 0 In addition, the Third LOS Convention cannot assure deep seabed mining companies that they will have access to the deep seabed.6 ' Moreover, this
provision may require that industrialized nations actively transfer technology 2 and share other benefits63 of mining with developing countries.
As a result, tension exists between the "laissez-faire" interpretation of
the industrialized countries and the interventionist approach of the developing countries to deep seabed mineral development."4 The result of
these concerns and differing approaches is that many nations, including
the United States, have not signed the Third LOS Convention.6 5
4.

Developments Outside the Third Law of the Sea Convention

Because of their dissatisfaction with the Third LOS Convention, industrialized nations capable of retrieving minerals from the ocean floor

tional jurisdiction.").
55. Because the equitable sharing of benefits is inconsistent with the profit motive,
the United States maintains that private enterprise will not take the risks involved in
developing new technologies and resources. See Matte, supra note 44, at 323; see also
Raclin, supra note 35, at 742. See generally Larschan, The InternationalLegal Status

of the Contractual Rights of Contractors Under the Deep Sea-Bed Mining Provisions
(Part XI) of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 14 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 207 (1986).

56. Third LOS Convention, supra note 4, art. 144, para. 1(a).
57. Id. art. 144, para. 1(b).
58. Id. art. 140, para. 2.
59. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 742.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See generally Third LOS Convention, supra note 4, art. 144.
63. Id. art. 140.
64. See Note, supra note 47, at 1437.
65. As of March 1, 1990, the Third LOS Convention had received 42 of the 60
ratifications required for its entry into force. See TrainingProgrammefor Enterprise to
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have established, outside the confines of the United Nations, a system
regulating deep seabed mining. The United States signed agreements
with other industrialized countries6 6 regulating the mining of the deep
seabed in 1982,67 1984,8 and 1987.69 As a result, two competing resource management regimes now exist: the Third LOS Convention and
the developed countries' Fee Access Regime (FAR)."0
France, Japan, and the Soviet Union were the first nations to register
as pioneer investors under the Third LOS Convention, despite their
signing the non-United Nations agreements. 1 In addition, India and the
People's Republic of China recently applied for pioneer investor status. 2
To qualify as a pioneer investor, a state or enterprise must have spent at
least thirty million dollars on deep seabed activities as of January 1,

be in Place by 1991, 27 U.N. CHRONICLE, June 1990, at 38, 39 [hereinafter Training
Programme].The United Kingdom and Germany are two other prominent nations withholding their signatures. See Recent Development, supra note 42, at 216.
66. Through the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act of 1980, 30 U.S.C. §
1401 (1988), the United States Congress has authorized the executive branch to make
such agreements with nations that have similar deep seabed mining interests.
67. Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relating to Polymetallic Nodules
of the Deep Seabed, done Sept. 2, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 950 (1982) [hereinafter
1982 Agreement]. The 1982 Agreement was signed by France, West Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States with the purposes of demarcating international
claims and resolving conflicts that might arise among explorers. See Larson, supra note
54, at 279.
68. Provisional Understanding Regarding Deep Seabed Matters, done Aug. 3, 1984,
reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1354 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Agreement]. The 1984 Agreement
was signed by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The purpose of the 1984 Agreement was to
prevent overlapping mine site claims among the major industrial states, See Larson,
supra note 54, at 279.
69. Agreement on the Resolution of Practical Problems with Respect to Deep Seabed
Mining Areas, done Aug. 14, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1502 (1987) [hereinafter
1987 Agreement]. The 1987 Agreement resolved conflicting claims within the ClarionClipperton fracture zone. Included as parties to this agreement were five signatories to
the Third LOS Convention (Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and the Soviet
Union), as well as three nonsignatories (the United Kingdom, the United States, and
West Germany). See Recent Development, supra note 42, at 216.
70. See generally Note, supra note 14, at 317. For an evaluation of the FAR and the
system under the Third LOS Convention, see Marvasti, Conceptual Model of the Management of InternationalResources: The Case of Seabed Minerals, 20 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 273 (1989).
71. See France,Japan, and USSR Register as Pioneer Investors, 25 U.N. CHRONICLE, Sept. 1988, at 52.
72. China to Apply for Pioneer Investor in Sea-bed Exploration, Xinhua News
Agency, Aug. 20, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Xinhua file).
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1986, 1 must continue to contribute a one million dollar annual fee, and
must transfer technology to, and train personnel for, the Enterprise.7
Although some experts are optimistic that the Third LOS Convention
eventually will come into effect, doubts as to its future viability are increasing.7 Factors contributing to the delay include the lack of urgency
due to changed market conditions, the low demand for minerals found in
the deep seabed, and the uncertainty surrounding the potential success of
deep seabed mining.76 Although the industrialized nations have their
own mining system, this cannot be a final solution; ignoring the developing nations, which outnumber the industrialized nations, will create
more problems than it solves.
III.

A.

OUTER SPACE

Natural Resources

Discussions on the possibility of mining the moon began when the first
lunar samples were brought back in 1969.! The limited information
regarding outer space, however, has made much of the research speculative. Space missions, which collected samples at six United States sites
and three Soviet Union sites, provide the main source of information
regarding minerals on the moon.7 8 The resources known or thought to
exist on the moon are aluminum, calcium, carbon, chromium, hydrogen,
iron, oxygen, manganese, magnesium, nitrogen, silicon, titanium, and
7
watery.
Oxygen makes up about forty percent of the lunar soil sam8
ples, " while another twenty percent is silicon.81 Other significant con-

73. See Training Programme,supra note 65, at 38.
74. See Current Development, supra note 27, at 366.
75. See Larson, When Will the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Come Into
Effect?, 20 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 175, 178-79 (1989).
76. See Current Development, supra note 27, at 366.
77. See Matte, supra note 44, at 319.
78. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the
Senate Comm, on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 150
(1980) [hereinafter Moon Hearings].
79. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 728. Robert A. Frosch, Administrator for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), stated that all the raw materials
on earth currently used for space missions are available in outer space. Moon Hearings,
supra note 78, at 37.
80.

See

(1986).
81. Id.

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SPACE, PIONEERING THE SPACE FRONTIER 85
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centrations are aluminum, fourteen percent, and iron, four percent.8 2
The homogeneous nature of the lunar surface indicates that there is little
variation in the mineral concentrations.8 3 Regardless of their abundance,
however, the major problem with recovering these resources is the
moon's distance from earth.
1.

Technological and Economic Capability

Technology exists to retrieve mineral resources on the moon, 4 but
mining will require the adaptation of conventional equipment for use on
the lunar surface, 5 substantial private investment, and a system to develop these resources.8 6 Some experts contend that mining on the moon
could be easier than mining Antarctica or the deep seabed.8 7 Because of
the great expense of mining minerals in outer space, however, private
industry is unwilling to commit large amounts of money without a stable
legal environment.8 8 Reducing the costs and improving the reliability of
outer space transportation is one way to encourage investment.8 9 Another
possibility for reducing costs is to utilize the minerals recovered from the
moon on the moon itself, which would eliminate the cost of transporting
the resources back to earth.9" One author has suggested that lunar minerals could be used to build outer space research laboratories or selfsustaining outer space communities. 1 Silicon, aluminum, and iron could
be a source of construction materials for space structures. 92 Once these
stations are established, they could provide other services. For example,
moon or space stations could produce and supply spacecraft with liquid
oxygen and hydrogen, the main propellants used in chemical rocket fuels, for flights back to earth or deeper into outer space. 93

82. Id.
83. Id. at 85-86.

84. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 729. For a discussion of mining methods, see Burt,
Mining the Moon, AM. SCIENTIST, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 574, 575-78.
85. See Note, The Commercial Space Launch Act: America's Response to the Moon
Treaty?, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 763, 763 n.2 (1987).
86. See Note, supra note 47, at 1428.
87. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 729.
88. See Note, supra note 47, at 1432-33.
89. See Simpson, supra note 13, at 13. The Challenger space shuttle disaster stalled
the United States space program; the feasibility of a space mining program may depend
on the future success of this program.
90. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 728-29 n.7.
91. See Simpson, supra note 13, at 12. Another plan calls for the creation of selfreplicating systems of automated mining operations. See id. at 14.
92. See Moon Hearings,supra note 78, at 37.
93. See Burt, supra note 84, at 574.
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Currently, unresolved problems such as the lack of an abundance of
water, essential for today's mining methods, and difficult living conditions make long term lunar mining expeditions unattractive.9 4 As resources on earth become scarcer and more costly to retrieve, however, the
mining of celestial resources may become more economically
competitive. 5
2.

Environmental Concerns

Because it is not known how lunar mining will affect the outer space
environment, less attention has been devoted to preserving the environment of the moon than to preserving the environments of the deep seabed
and Antarctica. Nevertheless, the environment in outer space should be a
concern. For example, more than six thousand pieces of outer space junk
currently orbit the earth. 8 On the other hand, industrial processing in
outer space and mining on the moon have the advantages of minimizing
pollution on earth."
B.

Treaties

1. Early Attempts
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies 8 (the Outer Space Treaty) of 1967 was the first attempt
to regulate outer space activities. The Outer Space Treaty was a product
of the United Nations and established broad guidelines for outer space
exploration. The Outer Space Treaty included two important developments. First, the Outer Space Treaty suggests that space exploration
should be undertaken for the benefit of all people.9 9 Second, the Outer
Space Treaty provides that outer space shall not be subject to national

94. See id.
95. See Note, supra note 47, at 1428.
96. See Garrison, Harvested Moon, OMNI, Apr. 1990, at 30.
97. See Comment, Outer Space, Like the Sea and the Air, Whose Frontier?,6 Hous.
J. INT'L L. 175, 178 (1984).
98. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10,
1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
99. "The exploration and use of outer space ... shall be carried out for the benefit. . . of all countries irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. . . ." Id. art. I.
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appropriation, 0 0 thereby avoiding sovereignty disputes.' In addition to
the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Treaty, 0 2 the Liability Convention, 0 3 and the Registration Convention' 04 attempted to establish international guidelines for outer space activities. All four agreements recognized the common interest of mankind in outer space without using the
exact language of the common heritage principle.'0 5 None of these documents, however, addressed the mineral resource issue.
2. The Moon Treaty
As knowledge concerning outer space and the moon increased, nations
recognized the need for a new treaty. The Moon Treaty'0 6 is the most
recent attempt to address current problems in outer space. Contrary to
expectations, this treaty has not won widespread acceptance. 0 7 As of
March 1989, only seven nations had ratified the Moon Treaty.' 0 8 Although this number was sufficient for the Moon Treaty to enter into
force, ' the Moon Treaty is binding on only those nations who have
ratified it." 0 The United States and the Soviet Union, along with most
nations that possess the technology necessary for outer space exploitation,
have not signed the Moon Treaty.
The goals of the Moon Treaty are the safe development and rational

100. Id. art. II.
101. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (discussing sovereignty claims in
Antarctica).

102. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, done Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,

T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (entered into force Dec. 3, 1968).
103.

Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,

done Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 (entered into force Oct. 9,
1973).
104. Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Jan.
14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8.480 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976).
105. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 735.
106. Moon Treaty, supra note 6.
107. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
POLICY 116 (1989). The rationale was that the Moon Treaty would give developing
nations a chance to share in the benefits of outer space. See Recent Development, Space

Law-Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
HARV. INT'L L.J. 579, 583 n.54 (1980).
108. Current Document, Present Status of Outer Space Treaties, March 1989, 17

Bodies, 21

J. SPACE L. 98, 99-102 (1989). These seven ratifying nations are Australia, Austria,
Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Uruguay. Id.
109. Moon Treaty, supra note 6, art. 19, para. 3.

110. See Matte, supra note 44, at 323.
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management of lunar resources and the equitable sharing of the benefits
derived from those resources. 1 1 Although the Moon Treaty reiterates
the general principles of prior treaties11 2 and only slightly extends the
existing law on outer space," 3 its major development is the regulation of
I1 4
mineral exploration.
The Moon Treaty has not been accepted broadly, however, because of
the inclusion of the common heritage principle and the lack of an international management organization." 5 The controversy over the Moon
Treaty focuses on two provisions of article 11. The first of these provisions states that "[t]he moon and its natural resources are the common
heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the provisions of this
Agreement .... ,116 As in the case of the Law of the Sea, the industrialized nations disagree with the common heritage principle, but the less
developed countries consider it essential.' 17
Each side has its own interpretation of the common heritage principle
within the Moon Treaty. Opponents of the Moon Treaty, including the
United States, contend that the Third LOS Convention sets the standard
by which any common heritage principle will be defined, and therefore,
the same meaning used under the Third LOS Convention will be applied to the Moon Treaty.""' Proponents of the Moon Treaty stress that
language within the document itself, "the common heritage of mankind,
which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement,"' " limits
its application. The proponents argue that the definition of the common
111. See Note, supra note 47, at 1435-36.
112. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 735.
113. See Note, supra note 47, at 1434.
114. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 736.
115. See Note, supra note 85, at 768. Both the United States and the Soviet Union
opposed an international regime that would rely on a one-nation, one-vote system because such a system would give the developing nations effective control of the development of resources in outer space. See id. at 771.
116. Moon Treaty, supra note 6, art. 11, para. 1. The latter part of this statement is
important only to the extent that it reflects an intent by the drafters to limit the common
heritage principle used in the Moon Treaty to the Treaty itself. See infra notes 119-21
and accompanying text.
117. The Moon Treaty is the first treaty in force to give effect in international law
to the concept of the common heritage of mankind because the Third LOS Convention
will not become effective until 60 nations ratify it. See Matte, supra note 44, at 319. The
common heritage principle in the Moon Treaty applies directly to natural resources and
not in the abstract as it did in the Outer Space Treaty. See Matte, Limited Aerospace
NaturalResources and Their Regulation, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 379, 391 (1982);
see also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 98, art. I.
118. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 742-43; see also Matte, supra note 44, at 322-23.
119. Moon Treaty, supra note 6, art. 11 (emphasis added).
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heritage principle is contained within the Moon Treaty, and therefore,
does not have to follow the precedent of the Third LOS Convention. 20
Unless the parties agree to another definition of common heritage, the
broadest interpretation, which favors developing countries, is likely to be
used in any 'subsequent treaty regardless of any reservations contained
within the subsequent treaty. 21 The effect of a broad interpretation will
be a treaty that remains unratified by the industrialized nations.
The second controversial provision found in article 11 of the Moon
Treaty provides for the establishment of "an international regime ... to
govern the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon."122 This
regime would provide for "[a]n equitable sharing by all States Parties in
This compromise prothe benefits derived from those resources ....
vision sought to provide the developing nations with an international regime, while allowing the industrialized nations to retain their right to
mine the moon.' 24 Proponents of the Moon Treaty argue that this language will not inhibit private commercial investment in celestial resource
exploitation. 25 Opponents, however, are concerned that private industry
in industrialized countries will abandon major exploratory opportunities
upon ratification of the Moon Treaty because they will obtain fewer
benefits from mining.1 28 In addition, although the Moon Treaty is a
compromise attempting to grant each side a fraction of its demands, the
Moon Treaty has failed to create a clear and enforceable structure. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the development of an international
regime, investors, including those from127nations that have ratified the
Moon Treaty, are reluctant to proceed.
Opponents also recognize that signing the Moon Treaty will bind the
industrialized countries to an international regime similar to the Third
LOS Convention, under which they have a limited voice. 2 8 The United

See Raclin, supra note 35, at 743; cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 98, art. I.
See Note, supra note 47, at 1437.
Moon Treaty, supra note 6, art. 11, para. 5.
Id. art. 11, para. 7(d).
See Mau, Equity, the Third World and the Moon Treaty, 8 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 221, 239 (1984).
125. See G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 107, at 114.
126. See Matte, supra note 44, at 323.
127. See Note, supra note 47, at 1443-44. The L-5 Society, a group of some 4000
space enthusiasts, argues that the Moon Treaty imposes a moratorium on the exploitation of celestial resources. Moon Hearings, supra note 78, at 109 (statement of Leigh
Ratiner, Counsel, L-5 Society). But see Matte, supra note 44, at 323 (Neil Hosenball,
former General Counsel of NASA, argues that no moratorium exists.).
128. See Note, supra note 47, at 1439.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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States and the Soviet Union likely will continue to require that any
treaty recognize their dominant participation in space exploration.1 29
Thus, like the Third LOS Convention, the Moon Treaty has little practical value.
IV.
A.

ANTARCTICA

Natural Resources

From the discovery of Antarctica in 1820 until the mid-1970s, the
world knew little about Antarctica. 3 " Recently, more attention has focused on this frozen continent as a result of the discovery of its potential
for resource exploitation.
The major hard minerals that have been found in Antarctica are copper, tin, and coal. 131 Mineralogists believe these resources are located in
the Antarctic Peninsula, 3 2 the Transantarctic Mountains, 3 3 and East
Antarctica.' 3 ' There also may be substantial amounts of oil 3 and natu129. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 754.
130. See Antarctica: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and
Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,98th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 46 (1984) [hereinafter Antarctic Hearings].
131. See Recent Development, supra note 42, at 240. Traces of other minerals found
in Antarctica include: chromium, cobalt, gold, lead, manganese, molybdenum, nickel,
platinum, silver, titanium, uranium, and zinc. See Note, supra note 3, at 46 n.10.
One scientific theory (plate tectonics) holds that the present continents of Antarctica,
Africa, and South America were connected approximately 180 million years ago. Thus,
the immense South African mineral deposits and the Andean copper and tin deposits
might be evidence of similar resources in Antarctica. See Recent Development, supra
note 42, at 240.
132. This region mainly contains copper and molybdenum, but there also may be
deposits of chromium, cobalt, nickel, and silver. See Bergsager, Basic Conditionsfor the
Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources in Antarctica: Options and Precedents in ANTARCTIC RESOURCE POLICY: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES
168 (1983); see also Note, Hiding Our Heads in the Snow: The Dilemma of Non-Living
Resources in Antarctica, 15 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 431, 434 (1989).
133. This region mainly contains coal. Gjelsvik, The Mineral Resources of Antarctica: Progress in Their Identification in ANTARCTIC RESOURCE POLICY: SCIENTIFIC,
LEGAL AND POLITICAL Issurs 62 (1983); see also Note, supra note 132, at 433.
134. This area contains iron, titanium, and gold. See Gjelsvik, supra note 133, at
62; see also Note, supra note 132, at 433; U.S. Policy with Respect to Exploitation of
Antarctic Resources: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, and InternationalEnvironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2nd.
Sess. 206 (1978) [hereinafter Antarctic Resource Hearings].Although coal deposits are
known to exist in East Antarctica, the coal is inaccessible and relatively impure. See
Note, supra note 132, at 435; see also Zumberge, Mineral Resources and Geopolitics in
Antarctica, AM. SCIENTIST, Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 68.
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ral gas.'" 6 In general, lack of knowledge, technological problems, severe
environmental conditions, remoteness, and political circumstances have
7
prevented mineral exploration of Antarctica until recently.'1
1. Technological and Economic Capability
Significant technological problems associated with mining in the highest, driest, and coldest desert. 8 reduce the feasibility of most projects.' 39
The unstable Antarctic environment is even less suited for major exploration than the deep seabed.' 40 Over ninety-eight percent of Antarctica is
covered with ice, averaging 2300 meters in thickness.' 4 ' These conditions
make the physical recovery of resources difficult.
The economic difficulties associated with mining Antarctica also are
significant. No large mineral deposits have been discovered in the continent, 4 2 and some experts dispute the existence of any commercially attractive opportunities in Antarctica. 1 43 One expert predicts that only neg135. Oil has been discovered in Antarctica and deposits may be richer than those
found in the deep seabed. In addition, evidence suggests that offshore oil deposits exist,
although no oil has been found to date. See Recent Development, InternationalAgree-

ments-Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 237, 240 (1989). See generally Antarctic Resource Hearings, supra
note 134, at 204-08. Exploitation of oil would be economically feasible only if there
existed substantial geologic reserves coupled with sufficiently high oil prices. See Recent

Development, supra, at 240; see also U.S. Policy with Respect to Mineral Exploration
and Exploitation in the Antarctic: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Comm.on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
31 (1975) [hereinafter Antarctic ExplorationHearings] (estimating that 45 million barrels of oil exist within Antarctica's continental shelf) (citing Shapley, Antarctica: World
Hungerfor Oil Spurs Security Council Review, SCIENCE, May 17, 1974, at 776, 777).
136. It is estimated that up to 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas exist under Antarctica. See Kindt, supra note 38, at 30.
137. See Zumberge, supra note 134, at 68.
138. See Note, supra note 132, at 435. Mean temperatures range from -70 ° celsius
to 00 celsius. Also, Antarctica is described as the windiest continent on earth. Zumberge,
supra note 134, at 70.
139. See Recent Development, supra note 135, at 240 (citing Mitchell, Undermining
Antarctica, TECH. REv., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 49, 54).
140. For a discussion of the technological problems of exploring Antarctica, see

Antarctic Resource Hearings,supra note 134, at 125-48.
141. See Zumberge, supra note 134, at 68; see also Doerner, Antarctica, How to
Open up the Coldest Cache, TIME, June 20, 1988, at 38. In addition, icebergs have been
found off the coast of Antarctica that are as large as Massachusetts. Id.
142. See Recent Development, supra note 135, at 240. See generally Rich, A Minerals Regime for Antarctica, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 709, 710 (1982).
143. See Shapley, PolarThinking on the Antarctic, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1989, at
A27, col. 2 ("[E]xploitation of Antarctic minerals is unlikely to occur for 'three decades,
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ligible profits are possible, due to the severe operating conditions on the
continent. 144 In addition, the transport of recovered minerals through the
ice and snow to ports of export would be costly.145 Moreover, the mining
and transport of these resources raises important environmental
questions.
2.

Environmental Concerns

146
Environmental concerns have dominated the Antarctic negotiations
and have had a drastic effect on the organization of the mineral resource
system. The opponents of an Antarctic mineral regime emphasize that
not enough is known about the potential adverse effects of mineral exploitation in the Antarctic environment. 147 Some opponents of exploration propose a moratorium on mineral development until more information can be obtained about the environmental impact that mining would
have on Antarctica. 148 Recent oil spills 49 and new evidence suggesting
that the Antarctic climate influences the earth's climate' 50 have added

if ever.' "); see also Note, supra note 132, at 436 (stating that only about 1% of the icefree surface of Antarctica has been explored).
144. Rich, supra note 142, at 709.
145. See Antarctic Resource Hearings, supra note 134, at 111.
146. See Colson, The Antarctic Treaty System: The Mineral Issue, 12 L. & POL'Y
INT'L Bus, 841, 843 (1980). Not only will the mining operations pollute the environment, but significant environmental problems already exist due to the presence of scientists and tourists on the Antarctic continent. See Carpenter, Opening the Last Frontier,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 24, 1988, at 64, 65-66; see also Anderson, MacKenzie,
& Dickson, Should Antarctica be Left on Ice?, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 14, 1989, at 28;
Joyner, Protection of the Antarctic Environment: Rethinking the Problems and Prospects, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 259 (1986). See generally Antarctic Resource Hearings,
supra note 134, at 216-17.
147. See Antarctic Hearings,supra note 130, at 61; see also id. at 87-88 (statement
by the Oceanic Society).
148. See id. at 61-64.
149. See Browne, France and Australia Kill Pact on Limited Antarctic Mining
and Oil Drilling, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1989, at A10,col. 1. For example, the Argentine resupply ship, Bahia Paraiso,ran aground in January 1989, producing a 7.4 mile
oil slick. The following month, two more ships ran aground. Kielmas, PollutionLiability
Rules for Antarctica to be Considered, Bus. INs., July 30, 1990, at 23, 24. The severe
Antarctic climate exacerbates the effects of oil spills because ice interferes with traditional clean-up methods and low temperatures retard the biological decomposition of oil.
See Colson, supra note 146, at 843 n.5.
150. See Larmer, The Great White Heap?, SIERRA, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 27, 28. Oil
spills not only damage the ecosystem and upset the entire Antarctic food chain, see Note,
supra note 48, at 529, but they also have a negative impact on the ozone layer, see Kindt,
supra note 38, at 35-36.
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vigor to calls for a permanent ban on exploration of Antarctica. Others
doubt that a voluntary moratorium could be enforced, but note that
without any system in place, more environmental damage will occur.1 1
B.

Treaties

Antarctica differs from the deep sea and outer space because nations
have made claims on portions of it. Seven countries assert claims of sovereignty over eighty-five percent of Antarctica.' 52 Even with these assertions of sovereignty, nations of the world have attempted to create an
international regime to govern Antarctica.
1. Early Attempts
The Antarctic continent is regulated by the Antarctic Treaty System, a
conventional regime comprised of several international agreements.' 5 3
The Antarctic Treaty, the first and most important document of the system, created a regime to' facilitate peaceful international cooperation for
scientific research"5 and environmental preservation. 5' The Antarctic
Treaty was intended to ease the tension surrounding various sovereignty
claims' 56 by preserving the status quo as to those territorial claims. In
1991, however, the Antarctic Treaty will be subject to change because
any of the signatory nations may call for a conference to review its

151.

Carpenter, supra note 146, at 66 (quoting R. Tucker Scully, Director, Office of

Oceans and Polar Affairs, U.S. Dep't State).
152.

Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United

Kingdom all have claims. See Barcel6, The InternationalLegal Regimefor Antarctica,
19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155, 156 (1986); see also Larmer, supra note 149, at 27. The
total land mass of Antarctica is over 5.5 million square miles. Id.
153. The Antarctic Treaty System consists of the following agreements: The
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10; Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic
Flora and Fauna, done June 2-13, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058; Convention
for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, done June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, T.I.A.S. No.
8826; Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, done May
20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240; Convention on the Regulation of

Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, opened for signature Nov. 25, 1988, reprinted in
27 I.L.M. 859 (1988) [hereinafter Antarctic Mineral Convention].

154. See Antarctic Resource Hearings, supra note 134, at 9.
155. See Barcel6, supra note 152, at 157.
156. See Note, supra note 3, at 47. The seven nations that assert sovereignty over
portions of Antarctica, see supra note 152, are all original signatories of the Antarctic
Treaty, see AntarcticHearings, supra note 130, at 9. The other five original signatories,
Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United States, neither assert,

nor recognize, these claims. See id.
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operation.' 57
2.

The Antarctic Mineral Convention

Although the Antarctic Treaty successfully promoted international research with a minimum amount of environmental damage, 58 it did not
address mineral exploitation.'5 9 Consequently, discussions that addressed
mineral development began in 1982160 and resulted in the Convention on
the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities (the Antarctic
Mineral Convention).""' The Antarctic Mineral Convention was completed on June 2, 1988, by the United States and thirty-two other countries. 6 2 Unlike the negotiations surrounding the conventions on the Law
of the Sea and regarding the moon, the negotiations for the Antarctic
Mineral Convention occurred entirely outside of the United Nations."3
In addition, the Antarctic Mineral Convention was designed and negotiated entirely between the industrialized nations, thereby negating any
influence the developing nations may have had in the negotiation of
other conventions.'"
The goal of the Antarctic Mineral Convention is to create a system to
regulate future development of mineral resources1 5 and to protect the
Antarctic environment."68 The Antarctic Mineral Convention follows,

157. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. XII; see Zumberge, supra note 134, at 75.
Before 1991, any amendment to the Antarctic Treaty requires unanimous approval; after
1991, any changes will require a majority vote. Id. at 75-76.
158. See Note, supra note 48, at 547.
159. The Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty agreed in 1977 to a "voluntary
restraint" on "all exploration and. exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources." Mitchell,

Antarctica: A Special Case?, NEW SCIENTISI, Jan. 13, 1977, at 64, 65, reprinted in
Antarctic Resource Hearings,supra note 134, at 66.
160. See Note, Death of a Treaty: The Decline and Fall of the Antarctic Minerals
Convention, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 631, 647 (1989).
161. Antarctic Mineral Convention, supra note 153.
162. Id. preamble.
163. See Starke, InternationalLegal Notes, 62 AUSTL. L.J. 956, 956 (1988).
164. The industrialized countries have an incentive to work outside the United Nations because the more numerous developing countries will dominate any United Nations
regime on account of the United Nations one-nation, one-vote system. See supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
165. See Starke, supra note 163, at 956.
166. See Recent Development, supra note 135, at 237. The Antarctic Mineral Convention lays "the foundation to do things sensibly" in Antarctica. Sun, Antarctica Pact
Could Open Way for Mining, SCIENCE, June 17, 1988, at 1612 (quoting James Barnes,
general counsel of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition, a group representing a
consortium of 175 environmental groups internationally).
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but also expands, the guidelines of the Antarctic Treaty to include mineral exploration. 1 7 The Antarctic Mineral Convention provides for five
institutions-the Antarctic Mineral Resource Commission (the Commission),168 the Scientific, Technical, and Environmental Advisory Committee, 6 9 various Regulatory Committees, 7 a special meeting of party
states,"' and a Secretariat 7 2 -to
- regulate the exploration and development of mineral resources.17 3 Mining can take place only with the unanimous agreement of all the signatories. Thus, one state's opposition
would be sufficient to veto an application. 74 Like the Antarctic Treaty,
however, the Antarctic Mineral Convention sidesteps the issue of territo17 5
rial claims.
Originally, the Antarctic Mineral Convention was to enter into force
after ratification by all sixteen Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties.1 6
A moratorium on exploitation and development exists until this occurs.1 7 7 The Antarctic Mineral Convention, however, effectively has collapsed since France and Australia have withdrawn their support." 8 In-

167. The Antarctic Mineral Convention recognizes the role of the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty in the minerals regime and follows the guidelines established
in the original Antarctic Treaty. See Note, supra note 160, at 648.
168. See Antarctic Mineral Convention,'supra note 153, arts. 18-22. The membership of the Antarctic Mineral Resource Commission (the Commission) includes the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties as of November 25, 1988, and any other party
involved in substantial scientific, technical, and environmental research on the continent.
Id. art. 18, para. 2. The Commission collects data on the impact of any proposed mining
operation, deciding where or if a site will be allowed. Id. art. 21; see also Anderson,
Antarctic Minerals Deal Headsfor Rocks, NEw SCIENTIST, May 20, 1989, at 21.
169. Antarctic Mineral Convention, supra note 153, arts. 23-28.
170. Id. arts. 29-32.
171. Id. art. 28.
172. Id. art. 33.
173. See Joyner, The Evolving Antarctic Minerals Regime, 19 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 73, 73 (1988).
174. See Anderson, MacKenzie, & Dickso'n, supra note 146, at 28. This veto, however, is likely to be used sparingly, because a nation that vetoes the activities of another
state later may find itself blocked from exploring a desirable area. See Sun, supra note
166, at 1612. Arguably, a major weakness of the Antarctic Mineral Convention is that it
does not give nonmembers, such as environmental groups, the right to participate in the
various committee meetings. Id.
175. See Doerner, supra note 141, at 38.
176. This would require the signature of the seven territorial claimants. See James,
The Fragile Continent, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 8, 1989, at 40; see also supra note
152 (listing the seven states with territorial claims).
177. See Starke, supra note 163, at 957. This moratorium was agreed upon by the
Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Mineral Convention. Id.
178. See Kielmas, supra note 149, at 24, col. 4. Jacques Cousteau, the French
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stead, these nations seek to declare Antarctica a "world wilderness
park."' " Similarly, opponents of the Antarctic Mineral Convention argue that an agreement which endorses even strictly regulated development of mineral resources is unacceptable. 8 The withdrawal of support
by France and Australia effectively destroys the Antarctic Mineral Convention because their ratification as Consultative Parties is required for
the Convention to go into effect." 8' Since these nations announced their
18 2
withdrawal, no nation has ratified the Antarctic Mineral Convention.

marine naturalist, is credited with successfully influencing many nations against supporting the Antarctic Mineral Convention. See Browne, supra note 149, at A10, col. 4.
The French have shown a lack of concern for the Antarctic environment in the past,
however. The French airstrip in the Pointe Geologie Region, one of the areas richest in
Antarctic fauna, has sparked international concern about environmental damage. See
Joyner, supra note 173, at 268. By building this airstrip, the French government appears to have breached the Antarctic Treaty System's environmental protection mandate.
Id. at 269.
One author asserts that Australia may have withheld support for the Antarctic Mineral Convention because ratification of the Convention threatened Australian sovereignty
over Antarctic territory. See Morgan, Australia Reconsiders Claims to Antarctic Mineral Resources, NATURE, Dec. 1, 1988, at 417.
1
179. See James, supra note 176, at 40. As the first step to protecting Antarctica as a
wilderness park, a resolution adopted at the Second World Conference on National
Parks in 1972 called or the parties to the Antarctic Treaty System to "negotiate to establish the Antarctic Continent and the surrounding seas as the first world park under the
auspices of the United Nations." Antarctic Hearings,supra note 130, at 68. The term
"wilderness park," rather than "world park," is used today because the latter implicates
the use of the common heritage principle and a lack of control by the treaty nations. See
Antarctic Antics, NEW SCIENTIST, June 3, 1989, at 20.
180. See Browne, supra note 149, at A10, col. 1. Environmental groups, such as
Greenpeace, propose a permanent moratorium on mineral development in Antarctica. See
Note, supra note 48, at 540. They contend that no valuable resources exist in the
Antarctic continent, and even if such resources exist, the environmental concerns drastically outweigh the monetary gains. See Tempest, France Urges Antarctic "Nature Reserve", L.A. Times, Oct." 10, 1989, at 7, col. 1.
"In order for companies to justify the massive cost of mining in Antarctica, supergiant
reserves must be discovered there .... With the exploitation of supergiant reserves there
would be catastrophic damage to the Antarctic environment from facilities, towns, roads,
airstrips, waste disposal facilities and spills." Shabecoff, U.S. Seeks Ban on the Exploration of Minerals and Oil in Antarctica, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1990, at A4, col. 1 (quoting Will Martin, Director of the Wilderness Society's Antarctica Project).
181. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
182. See Tempest, supra note 180, at 7, col. 1. Belgium, Brazil, Mexico, India, and
Italy, id., as well as Austria, Bulgaria, and Greece have indicated their opposition to
ratification since the withdrawal of France and Australia, see Talks in Paris on Protecting Antarctica Fail, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1989, at 16, col. 3. Spain is the most recent
nation to withdraw its support. Spain Backs Ban on Mining in Antarctic, Opposes Con-
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As of last year, however, the United States, the United Kingdom, and
New Zealand still advocated the ratification of the Antarctic Mineral
Convention.1 83 These proponents of the Antarctic Mineral Convention
argued that the regulations under the Convention are tougher than any
current national environmental protection legislation and, therefore,
would protect the fragile environment adequately.'"
Recently, New Zealand, a proponent of the Antarctic Mineral Convention, softened its position and now supports the position of France
and Australia. 85 In a similar action to strengthen its position, Australia,
an opponent of the Convention, has taken a tougher stance by prohibiting its companies from mining or drilling for oil within the Australian
Antarctic Territory, which comprises about forty percent of the
continent." 6
The debate over the permanent moratorium continued at the Fifteenth
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting held in Paris during October
1989.1 17 Although the thirty-nine nations that participated in the meeting failed to agree on a definite solution,' the group agreed to hold

vention, Reuter News Rep., Sept. 20, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter file).
183. See Tempest, supra note 180, at 7, col. 1. But see Shabecoff, supra note 180, at
A4, col. 1 ("The United States has not ratified the [Antarctic Minerals Convention] and
is not likely to do so.").
184. See James, supra note 176, at 40. If, however, sufficient quantities of minerals
are found in or near Antarctica before the establishment of an international regime or an
agreement on a permanent moratorium, a chaotic, ill-conceived development might result. Uncontrolled mineral exploitation would be much more detrimental to the continent's environment than development under the Antarctic Mineral Convention. See Anderson, MacKenzie, & Dickson, supra note 146, at 20.
185. Louisson, New Zealand to Fight for Antarctic Park Among Treaty Nations,
Reuter News Rep., July 6, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Reuter file). In 1975, the New
Zealand government proposed that Antarctica be made a world park and that New Zealand would surrender its territorial claim if other nations did the same. See Tempest,
supra note 180, at 7, col. 2. New Zealand now appears to have come full circle.
In a similar change of position, a resolution proposed by Senator Albert Gore, Jr.
would postpone the United States ratification of the Antarctic Mineral Convention until
it has been studied exhaustively. Id. Recently, both the United States House of Representatives and the United States Senate have passed bills urging the Secretary of State to
negotiate a ban on mineral resource activities in Antarctica. See Shabecoff, supra note
180, at A4, col. 2.
186. See Martin, Australia to Ban Polar Oil Drilling, Daily Tel., Aug. 20, 1990
(LEXIS, Nexis library, Telegr file).
187. U.S., Britain Rebuff Bid to Reserve Antarcticafor Wildlife, L.A. Times, Oct.
21, 1989, at A14, col. 2.
188. For a discussion of the recommendations, see Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties Gather in Parisfor 15th Meeting, ANTARCTIC J. U.S., Mar. 1990, at 1.
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another meeting in Santiago, Chile, during November and December
1990.189
As the negotiations on the Antarctic Mineral Convention progressed,
less developed countries began to voice their opinions. As a result of a
1983 Malaysian initiative, the Antarctic was included on the agenda of
the United Nations General Assembly.190 Nations not party to the
Antarctic Mineral Convention objected to its limited participation of
only industrialized nations.1"' These developing nations sought greater
international cooperation and an equitable sharing of the benefits according to the common heritage principle." 2
Those who support the Antarctic Mineral Convention recognize that
"it is in the interest of all mankind that the Antarctic Treaty area shall
continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes,"' 93 but
that the Antarctic Mineral Convention lacks any language resembling
the common heritage principle. Instead, the wording "all mankind" was
substituted.9 . to avoid the common heritage principle. To satisfy both the
developing and industrialized nations, an agreement on Antarctica's resources must resolve the common heritage debate.
Now that the Antarctic Mineral Convention effectively has failed,' 9 5
the developing countries likely will try to create a treaty within the
United Nations based upon the examples set forth in the Third LOS
Convention' 98 and the Moon Treaty. 97 These two treaties have no prac-

189. See Kielmas, supra note 149, at 23, col. 1. It appears that the United States
supports a moratorium of up to 30 years since "it would be at least that long before
mining activities could be technologically and commercially feasible in Antarctica's inhospitable climate." Shabecoff, supra note 180, at A4, col. 3. Although the United States
representative to the Santiago talks was "confident that some form of moratorium on
mineral development would emerge from the Santiago meeting .... the creation of an
Antarctic world park or ecological preserve 'will not be on the table. . . .'" Id. (quoting E. U. Curtis Bohlen, Asst. Sec'y, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Dept. State).
190. Antarctic Hearings, supra note 130, at 42 (statement by John V. Byrne, Administrator, Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration, U.S. Dep't Commerce). The
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties opposed the initiative, stressing the validity of the
Antarctic Treaty System. See Barcel6, supra note 152, at 277.
191. Antarctic Hearings,supra note 130, at 55.
192. See supra notes 43-65 & 117-21 and accompanying text.
193. Antarctic Mineral Convention, supra note 153, preamble.
194. Using the term "all mankind," rather than "common heritage," recognizes the
sovereignty dispute in the area, while also acknowledging the importance of this land
mass to the world community.
195. See supra note 178.
196. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 106-29 and accompanying text.
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tical effect, however, and any new United Nations Antarctic Treaty must
address the problems that caused the demise of these two previous
treaties.
V.

COMPARISON AND PROPOSALS

The laws regarding mineral exploration of the deep seabed, outer
space, and Antarctica are interrelated, even though historically each area
has been approached separately. Recognizing their interdependence and
similarities is essential if successful agreements are to be negotiated in
the future. The basic similarities between the areas are threefold: the
minerals lie outside any nation's territory; important technological difficulties require substantial expenditures for mineral exploration now and
in the future; and environmental concerns are a high priority. All three
areas also face the problems of resolving the debate over the common
heritage principle and establishing an international management regime
that emphasizes environmental protection.
The treaty negotiations for each area underwent two stages-one in
the 1950s and 1960s... and one within the past twelve years."' The
earlier treaties did not address the mineral resource issue. Increased recognition of the potential value of minerals, the energy crisis of the 1970s,
and the shifting balance of power toward the developing countries have
helped set in motion the new era of treaty negotiations in all three
systems.
In the various negotiations concerning each area, the views of two adversarial camps have conflicted on how these new resources should be
allocated and governed. The developing nations embraced the common
heritage principle,20 0 and the industrialized nations sought to secure free
access to mineral sites without sharing the benefits with those nations
that lack the necessary mining or exploration technology. The first step
to a successful agreement for these areas is the creation of an international management framework.
Chaos would result if substantial development of minerals in any area
began without a management system already in place. Although the
Antarctic Mineral Convention achieved the greatest degree of apparent
success of the three recent sets of negotiations, its long term effect would
have been to create more problems than it solved, since it ignored a
198. The First LOS Convention, see supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text, the
Outer Space Treaty, see supra note 98 and, the Antarctic Treaty, see supra note 10.
199. The Third LOS Convention, see supra note 4, the Moon Treaty, see supra

note 6, and the Antarctic Mineral Convention, see supra note 153.
200.

See supra notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
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growing section of the world community. All truly substantive negotiations must include both developing and industrialized nations, and the
negotiations likely will occur within an international organization that
has a one-nation, one-vote system. Because the industrialized countries
make up a minority of nations, they must recognize at least some of the
demands of the developing countries.2" 1
Industrialized nations, like the United States, however, do not want
developing countries that are not contributing technology or money to the
development of the resources to control the regime. Although the developing countries should have both a voice in forming the regime and the
potential to share in benefits, they should not have ultimate control over
the parties who bear the risk.20 2
Therefore, a regime should be structured that both the numerous developing countries and the wealthy, technologically advanced countries
will ratify under a one-nation, one-vote system. Preferably, this system
will provide immediate gains and control of development to the countries
or entities that take the initial risks and will provide the developing
countries with a future opportunity to take part in either the development or conservation of the areas.
Once a consensus is reached on the international management system,
this framework should be used to reach an agreement on the common
heritage principle in terms of benefit sharing or ownership rights and
technology transfer. One possible solution to the benefit sharing or ownership issue is to divide the deep seabed, the moon, and Antarctica into
distinct geographic portions, with each nation getting a share. 0 3 Those
nations possessing the technology could exploit their portions today; developing nations would reserve their region for future development. Another possibility is to allow those nations possessing the necessary technology to exploit any region they choose on the condition that they place
a percentage of their profits into a fund that would be available in the
future to countries in earlier technological stages.
Another solution, proposed by environmental groups,20 4 is a permanent moratorium on resource exploitation. This only would delay a solution to the problem. Such a voluntary measure is not legally enforceable
and ignores the needs of the future.2 05 It is true that the environment is a

201. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 756.
202. See id. at 759. Not only should developing countries have seats on the regime,
but specific sites could be reserved for their future development. Id. at 758.
203. See id. at 758.
204. See Note, supra note 48, at 540.
205. See id.
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major concern, and any regime adopted must provide for an agency to
protect against environmental damage. Avoidance is no solution, however. Although some factions would like to hinder exploration, the effect
of the developing nations and environmental groups insisting on a permanent moratorium on exploration would be to drive the industrialized
nations away from a universal agreement.
However the ownership issue is resolved, a satisfactory definition of
the common heritage principle also must address the transfer of technology from industrialized to developing nations. One solution is for industrialized nations to concede to share the benefits of their resource exploitation on the condition that the developing nations agree that they
would utilize transferred technology only after a specified period of
time,s0 6 much like a patent system.20 7 The United States patent system
gives creators exclusive rights to enjoy the benefits of their inventions for
a specific amount of time.20 8 Using the United States patent system as a
model would provide those countries possessing the technology with time
to exploit it, while also transferring the technology to nations who could
use it at a later date. Such compromises must be examined if both groups
are to agree to a workable solution.
Cooperation is essential if any agreement is to be reached among the
conflicting groups. The developing countries must recognize that allowing some structured development is preferable to uncontrolled mining
by industrialized countries. Industrialized countries, for their part, must
recognize that they can obtain more benefits within an international system than from exploitation in the absence of such a system. If an agreement is not reached, no group will be satisfied because all three areas
will suffer from erratic development, which eventually will destroy both
the environment and the opportunities for peaceful, profitable
development.
Thus, the same structure of an international regime can be used in
each area with some adjustments made for each area's unique features.2" 9 Combine this with a common heritage principle that resolves

206. One suggestion for Antarctica would be for the Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Parties to lease Antarctic drilling and mining areas to the Enterprise of the Third LOS
Convention so that equitable sharing would occur without the technology transfer. See
Note, supra note 3, at 76-77.
207. The enormous start-up costs required for exploitation of all three areas, which
will lead to profits only in the longer term, may cause problems with this suggestion.
This may be acceptable, however, if the developing nations agree to a sufficiently long
period of technology protection.
208. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 759 & n.202.

209.

Although there are similarities among the areas, it is essential that the negotiat-
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the technological and profit sharing problems, and successful treaties in
each area are possible. Recognizing the interdependence of these three
areas' development will facilitate the success of these systems in the
future.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The future of mineral resource exploration outside the confines of national jurisdiction is unclear. Important changes have occurred between
the first successful rounds of treaties in 1959 and the latest attempts to
regulate mineral exploration. Most sighificantly, technological advances
have made mineral exploitation more plausible. Moreover, there is
growing concern that land-based mineral resources may be exhausted in
the near future. As a result, nations are searching for new resources,
hoping to become less dependent on imports from other countries. Finally, the early treaties were made when the developing countries were
not a significant, unified voice. Now, even though the developing countries lack the economic strength and the technology to engage in resource
exploration, they outnumber the developed nations and are asserting
their power. 1 °
Instead of working within each area individually, the two problems
that plague all three areas, the common heritage principle and the management regime, should be resolved at one time. Once these issues are
resolved, separate discussions can begin for each area using common definitions and adapting the scheme agreed upon earlier to each area's own
specific needs.
Answers to the problems presented above must be found soon. The
near future holds opportunities for change with the review of the
Antarctic Treaty in 1991,211 the International Space Year in 1992,12
and the review of the Moon Treaty in 1994.21' Recognition that the
deep seabed, outer space, and Antarctica have an impact beyond their
boundaries is the first step toward the cooperation needed in the future.
In the end, all nations involved will benefit from a clear system of man-

ing parties recognize the areas' differences. Any agreement reached on either the common
heritage principle or the management regime must be flexible enough to accommodate
these variations without sacrificing definiteness. The basic differences between the deep
seabed, outer space, and Antarctica concern the uniqueness of recoverable minerals, location, and the time when future exploration will be reasonable.
210. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 755.
211. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 10, art. XII.
212. See Raclin, supra note 35, at 760.
213. Id.
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agement for each of the three areas that incorporates a unified definition
of the common heritage principle.
BarbaraEllen Heim

